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Stepping stones are compromised hosts in a network which can be used by hackers
and other malicious attackers to hide the origin of connections. Attackers hop
from one compromised host to another to form a chain of stepping stones before
launching attack on the actual victim host. Various timing and content based
detection techniques have been proposed in the literature to trace back through
a chain of stepping stones in order to identify the attacker. This has naturally
led to evasive strategies such as shaping the traffic differently at each hop. The
evasive techniques can also be detected.
Our study aims to adapt some of the existing stepping stone detection and anti-
evasion techniques to software-defined networks which use network function vir-
tualization. We have implemented the stepping-stone detection techniques in a
simulated environment and use sFlow for the traffic monitoring at the switches.
We evaluate the detection algorithms on different network topologies and analyze
the results to gain insight on the effectiveness of the detection mechanisms. The
selected detection techniques work well on relatively high packet sampling rates.
However, new solutions will be needed for large SDN networks where the packet
sampling rate needs to be lower.
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Spr˚angbra¨dor a¨ventyras va¨rdar i ett na¨tverk som kan anva¨ndas av hackare och
andra skadliga angripare att do¨lja ursprunget av anslutningar. Angripare hopp
fr˚an en komprometterad va¨rd till en annan fo¨r att bilda en kedja av att kliva ste-
nar innan lansera attack p˚a sja¨lva offret va¨rd. Olika timing och inneh˚allsbaserad
detekteringsteknik har fo¨reslagits i litteraturen att sp˚ara tillbaka genom en ked-
ja av spr˚angbra¨da fo¨r att identifiera angriparen. Detta har naturligtvis lett till
undvikande strategier som forma trafiken annorlunda vid varje hopp. De undan
tekniker kan ocks˚a detekteras.
V˚ar studie syftar till att anpassa vissa av de befintliga inledande uppta¨ckt
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Dock kommer nya lo¨sningar att beho¨vas fo¨r stora SDN na¨tverk da¨r paketsamp-
lingshastigheten beho¨ver vara la¨gre.
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5G 5th Generation (mobile network)
APT Advanced Persistent Threat
BaaS Botnets-as-a-Service
C&C Command-and-Control
DDOS Distributed Denial of Service
DNS Domain Name System
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NOS Network Operating System
NSC Network Service Chaining
P2P Peer-to-peer
RTT Round-trip time
SBI South-Bound Interface
SDN Software-Defined Networking
sFlow Sampled Flow
9
SSH Secure Shell
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
VLAN Virtual Local Area Network
VoIP Voice over IP
VPN Virtual Private Network
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Stepping stones [38] are compromised hosts in a network which can be used
by attackers to evade detection. The attackers hop from one host to another
before attacking the victim host in order to hide their identities. Efficient
stepping stone detection techniques in the literature are able to identify the
intermediate stepping stones and trace connections back to the host from
which the attack originates. There are various stepping stone detection tech-
niques [11, 20, 38, 55] which are able to detect stepping stones with high accu-
racy. Newer attack strategies include using botnets for launching distributed
denial-of-service (DDOS) attacks or spamming. These strategies necessitate
detection techniques which no more rely on traffic patterns generated due
to human interaction. Various botnet detection techniques [29] such as deep
packet inspection and scanning exist. Also the advent of anonymity net-
works like Tor [41] necessitates strong deanonymization techniques in case
the attacker uses these networks for attacks.
Stepping stone detection techniques have not yet been evaluated or stud-
ied in the context of software-defined networking (SDN) [24] or network func-
tion virtualization (NFV) [2] environments. SDN is an easily programmable
network architecture which separates the control plane from the data plane.
A logically centralized controller uses the network-wide view provided by the
network operating system (NOS) to effectively configure and control the data
plane, which consists of forwarding elements (switches). NFV, on the other
hand, aims to remove dependency on middle-boxes in networks by virtualiz-
ing network functions, which can be run on virtual appliances. Naturally, the
stepping stone detection mechanisms must be adapted to these new environ-
ments. The significance lies in the fact that these technologies will be heavily
used in the upcoming 5th generation (5G) mobile network architecture, and
effective detection of attacks will make the network robust and trustworthy.
13
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1.1 Research Problem
Our goal is to analyze challenges of stepping stone detection in SDN and
NFV environments, especially within upcoming 5G network architecture, as
well as conduct practical experiments demonstrating detection. We aim to
achieve the following:
1. Analyze existing stepping stone detection techniques and their appli-
cability to SDN and NFV based network architectures.
2. Propose and build an efficient SDN and NFV based architecture that
supports the stepping stone detection mechanisms.
3. Evaluate the proposed architecture on various network topologies.
1.2 Research Methods
We first theoretically analyze the stepping stone attacks and their detec-
tion techniques. We then propose an architecture to support the detection
techniques in SDN and NFV environments. In the experimental part, we im-
plement the detection techniques and evaluate their effectiveness on various
network topologies.
1.3 Impact and Sustainable Development
SDN and NFV are new avenues in computer networks. For wide-scale adop-
tion of these techniques, it is necessary to make them robust and secure.
Network monitoring plays a critical role in making any network robust. Iden-
tifying correlated connections is a part of network monitoring and helps in
identifying stepping stones and tracing back to the attacker if there is any
attack on the network devices. We believe that our study regarding detection
of stepping stones in SDN and NFV environments is an essential component
of network monitoring in SDN and NFV, which is essential for the success of
these techniques in the word of networks. There are ethical impacts of our
study on the society as we propose an architecture to detect criminal attack-
ers. Also it is our responsibility as engineers to analyze and fix vulnerabilities
of new technologies before they are deployed.
SDN and NFV enable low-cost installation and maintenance of networks.
Due to the separation of the control plane and the data plane, the net-
work devices have to perform less computation leading to energy savings.
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Moreover, costly vendor-locked devices are no longer necessary and can be
replaced by low-cost Linux boxes. Hence, wide adoption of SDN and NFV
will lead to sustainable development of the technology and business. Up-
coming 5G telecommunication networks will rely heavily on SDN and NFV.
These networks will provide connectivity to millions of people who are not
yet connected to mobile networks, thus reducing the communication latency
for them.
1.4 Structure of the Thesis
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 introduces the con-
cepts of stepping stone attacks, SDN, NFV and the significance of SDN and
NFV in 5G networks. Chapter 3 discusses stepping stone attacks in fur-
ther detail along with the existing detection techniques. Chapter 4 explains
our approach to adapting the existing stepping stone detection techniques to
SDN and NFV environments, as well as the experimental implementation.
Chapter 5 presents the experimental results along with their interpretation
while chapter 6 discusses the significance of the results along with the limi-
tations of the current study and future directions. Chapter 7 concludes the
thesis.
Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, we give an overview of stepping stone attacks, SDN, NFV
and the role of SDN and NFV in upcoming 5G networks.
2.1 Stepping Stone Attacks
In order to remain anonymous and evade detection, attackers establish long
chains of connections from one compromised host to another and finally at-
tack the victim host as shown in Figure 2.1. These intermediate compromised
hosts are called stepping stones, and the family of attacks is known as step-
ping stone attacks. In order to identify the source of the attack, one needs
to correlate the stepping stones in the chain and the connections between
them. There are various ways in which stepping stones can be detected.
Early detection techniques were content based [38]. The newer ones rely on
timing-based detection techniques [1, 45, 54, 55]. This is because advanced
attackers encrypt traffic at each intermediate node, which make detecting
stepping stones based on correlated content impossible. Zhang et al. [55]
propose a timing-based detection technique which relies on the interactive
pattern of human typing, which generates traffic with periods when data
flows and periods when there is no data. The former is called an ON pe-
riod while the latter is called an OFF period. Connections are identified as
correlated if their ON/OFF periods are highly correlated based on timing.
Jitter and Chaff Attackers can evade the timing-based stepping stone
detection strategies by deliberately introducing random jitter and chaff in
the generated traffic at some or all of the intermediate hosts. Random delay
or jitter, introduced at an intermediate host, results in the distortion of
ON/OFF period timings. Chaff packets or random padding added between
16
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Figure 2.1: A typical stepping-stone attack.
two adjacent stepping stones result in increased number of ON periods or ON
periods with longer duration. Both these techniques hinder the detection
of stepping stones. Various anomaly detection techniques [11] have been
proposed which detect jitter and chaff in interactive traffic. These can be
used to augment the timing based stepping stone detection techniques.
2.2 Software-defined Networking
SDN is an emerging network architecture [31] where the data plane and
the control plane are separated to make the network easily and dynamically
configurable and programmable. As shown in Figure 2.2, the network archi-
tecture has 3 tiers: the application tier, the control tier and the infrastructure
tier. The control tier consists of the logically centralized controller, which
provides a network-wide view of the forwarding elements and their states to
the application tier via north-bound interfaces (NBI). Distributed routing
protocols are replaced in SDN by algorithms that make use of the global
view of the network. The centralized control plane is the single point of con-
figuration for the network administrators. The controller in turn manages
the forwarding elements. Hence, the traffic can be dynamically shaped by
the administrators without configuring the individual forwarding elements.
NOX1, POX2, Floodlight3 and OpenDaylight4 are some widely used open-
source SDN controllers.
The wide range of applications residing in the application tier, including
load balancers, monitoring applications and intrusion detection systems use
the network wide view provided by the control tier to monitor and control
the data plane. These applications can use the NBI to specify network-level
requirements to the controller. The controller translates the requirements
into instructions for the forwarding elements.
1http://www.noxrepo.org/
2http://www.noxrepo.org/pox/about-pox/
3http://www.projectfloodlight.org/floodlight/
4https://www.opendaylight.org/
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Figure 2.2: Overview of SDN architecture.
The infrastructure tier (data plane) consists of forwarding elements which
typically forward packets based on layer-2 and layer-3 headers and are known
as switches. The controller communicates with the switches using south-
bound interfaces (SBI). The SBI is used by the controller to send instructions
to the switches and by the switches to consult the controller when they are
not able to make the forwarding decision based on the previous instructions.
Some of the well-known SBIs are OpenFlow [30], Forwarding and Control
Element Separation (ForCES) [13] and SoftRouter [25].
2.2.1 OpenFlow
OpenFlow is currently the most widely used SBI. OpenFlow controllers com-
municate with OpenFlow compliant switches in the data plane through a
control channel specified by the OpenFlow standard [3]. The controller in-
stalls flow entries to the flow tables of the switches. Each flow table entry
contains match header fields, counters and actions (forward, drop, modify
fields, etc.). The switches match incoming packets with the flow table entries,
increment the counters and take the corresponding actions. The controller
can control the routing behaviour of the switches by inserting, updating or
deleting flow table entries.
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2.2.2 sFlow
sFlow [34] is a traffic monitoring technique in networks. Low cost sFlow
agents are installed in the switches which sample packets and forward sam-
pled data to a data collector for analysis. sFlow defines the sampling tech-
niques used in the sFlow agents, the sFlow management information base
(MIB) used by the sFlow collector (analyzer) to control the sFlow agents
and the format of the data forwarded by the sFlow agents to the collector.
OpenFlow and sFlow are complementary technologies. OpenFlow is an
SBI for the SDN environments which configures the switches by translating
user requirements into instructions and installing flow entries into the flow
tables of the switches. sFlow, on the other hand, provides an API for net-
work monitoring and opens up the possibility of performance aware network
management and provisioning.
Cisco’s NetFlow [8] and IPFIX (IETF’s alternative to NetFlow) [9] serve
a similar purpose to sFlow by forwarding flow records to an analyzer. A flow
in NetFlow and IPFIX context refers to the set of packets with similar at-
tributes. The switches sample packets, decode the headers to retrieve values
of header fields like the source and destination IP addresses and source and
destination ports, hash the decoded values to identify the flow in the flow
cache, and update the flow with new values. On termination of the flows,
the flow records are flushed from the cache and forwarded to the analyzer.
sFlow5, in contrast to NetFlow and IPFIX, samples packets and forwards
the sampled header information to the collector. The collector is responsible
for decoding and analyzing the data. sFlow also provides a polling mech-
anism which periodically sends the values of the interface counters to the
collector. This simplified sampling and forwarding mechanism reduces the
performance overhead in the switches. Thus, sFlow is lightweight and does
not consume resources by maintaining a flow cache in the switches. Its design
also emphasizes scalability.
2.3 Network Function Virtualization
Network functions include switching, tunnelling, monitoring, service assur-
ance, signalling and security functions. These network functions are imple-
mented in proprietary hardware appliances which consume space and power
in the network. Moreover, these hardware boxes require special skills to be
administered and may result in vendor lock-in. Network function virtual-
ization or NFV [5] aims to virtualize these network functions by leveraging
5http://blog.sflow.com/2012/05/software-defined-networking.html
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virtualization techniques and commodity hardware. NFV facilitates the en-
try of software players in the networking market. Virtual network functions
are built with software running on commodity hardware. These network
functions can be instantiated in any part of the network without installing
specialized hardware. NFV makes scaling up, scaling down and evolution of
the network functions more flexible.
NFV and SDN are complimentary but independent concepts. NFV aims
to provide virtualized network functions while SDN aims to separate the
control and data planes in the network. Both these technologies aim to
enhance network performance, simplify maintenance and dynamically control
and provision network resources. Both NFV and SDN aim to use commodity
hardware and switches to lower the overall cost of networking.
2.4 SDN and NFV in 5G
Fifth generation mobile network or 5G [27] is the next generation of telecom-
munication networks that is expected to provide extremely high bandwidth,
low latency and highly robust connectivity to human users as well as the In-
ternet of Things. Interconnections between the cellular networks and other
wireless access infrastructures, forming heterogeneous networks (HetNets),
will characterize 5G networks. Integrating satellite communication and sup-
plying data from distributed sources to cloud-based big-data applications
are some of the challenges 5G aims to solve. Robustness and resilience are
necessary in order to support this varying range of services efficiently.
Adoption of SDN in mobile networks [19] helps to isolate the data plane
from the control plane and eases the development of applications that provide
network-level services at the application tier via NBI. The SDN controller
performs network management using its global view of the network. This en-
ables dynamic on-demand allocation of resources and network virtualization.
NFV aims to replace dedicated hardware devices by software-based network
function implementations deployed in virtualized infrastructure. The net-
work providers can easily roll out new services on these hyper-flexible and
programmable networks.
SDN and NFV may be used to provide network service chaining [19],
which aims to provide chains of services in the network processing path. As
SDN pulls out the management functions from network devices and places
them in a software-based controller and NFV pulls out the network functions
from hardware devices and builds them into software running on commod-
ity servers, no additional hardware is required to provide network service
chaining in SDN and NFV environments. Instead, the chaining can be im-
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plemented and configured in software.
Chapter 3
Stepping Stone Attacks
In this chapter we describe stepping stone attacks in detail, discuss the rel-
evance of the stepping stone attacks in today’s networks and the various
techniques for detecting stepping stones. Finally, we identify the significance
of the attacks in SDN and NFV environments.
3.1 Significance in Today’s Internet
Stepping stone attacks have existed since the early days of the Internet.
Attackers try to hide their identity behind a chain of intermediate nodes
compromised earlier while launching attacks on further victims. Also, an
external intruder might compromise one host in an administered network
by exploiting some vulnerabilities and use the host as a launch pad to gain
useful insight about the network and hosts lying within it. Intrusion detection
systems (IDS) and forensic analysis try to identify the node from which the
attack was conducted. Once the node is detected, it is identified to be the
launch-pad for the attack and the real attacker lies somewhere else. Hence,
at each step, an intermediate node or stepping stone has to be detected until
the first node in the chain is found. It is evident that identifying each of
the stepping stones in a long chain in the Internet is extremely difficult.
Individual organizations or even Internet Service Providers (ISPs) may not
be able to get the data (log files in intermediate nodes, timing of packets,
size of packets, etc.) necessary for the detection due to the heterogeneous
nature of the Internet with so many stakeholders involved. Hence most of
the studies in this field restrict the scope to the detection of stepping stones
within a single administrative domain.
The first significant study [38] in this field was published in 1995 by
Staniford-Chen and Heberlein. They used content-based thumbprints, which
22
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are summaries of contents similar to checksum to identify two different in-
teractive connections with similar content. Content-based techniques lost
importance as it became possible to encrypt content at each intermediate
node. Since then, a lot of studies have been conducted which try to detect
stepping stones in a chain based on timing as well as packet-size correlation.
A lot of these studies consider random jitter and chaff deliberately inserted
by the attacker in the traffic to make detection difficult.
Most of the papers in this domain have been published 10-15 years ago.
This raises a question whether stepping stone attacks have become irrelevant.
In the following sub-sections we present a few counter-arguments. We present
cases of advanced persistent threats (APTs) and APT-type attacks where the
attacker has access to a part of the network where he stays for a long time
in order to steal data.
3.1.1 Panama Paper Leak - A Case Study
In the Panama Papers Leak incident [6, 36, 40] in April 2016, attackers
gained access to the email server of a Panama-based firm. According to
the speculations, the external attacker exploited vulnerabilities in the email
server to compromise it. The attacker then exploited this compromised server
as a stepping stone to gain more knowledge of the internal network and steal
highly confidential documents revealing client information. This attack is an
example of APT where the attacker has spent a long time in the internal
network of the company undetected, interactively exploring the network and
eventually stealing terabytes of data. The nature of the attack is similar
to stepping stone attacks where attack traffic as well as stolen data pass
through a chain of stepping stones before reaching the victim and the attacker
respectively.
3.1.2 Surveillance Video Stream Hijacking
In Figure 3.1, digital video cameras send the video streams to a storage
device. An external attacker might gain access to the camera by exploiting
a vulnerability after which he can forward the video streams to an arbitrary
location in the Internet. Here, a compromised host in the intranet acts as a
launch pad or stepping stone. Videos can be delta compressed and only the
changes from one frame to the next are forwarded to the storage device. In
this case, the network traffic might have inherent ON (data) and OFF (no
data) periods. The attacker may also want to watch a live stream and only
enable it intermittently.
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Figure 3.1: Video stream hijacking
3.1.3 Anonymous Networks and Tor
The aim of anonymous networks like Tor [41] is to provide anonymity to the
users. Generally, such a network consists of a set of relay servers operated by
volunteers. In the Tor network1, the traffic between the client and each relay
node is symmetrically encrypted using keys generated through authenticated
key exchange protocols. There are three relay nodes in a path and each node
decrypts the top layer of encryption and forwards the decrypted content to
the next node in the path. The last relay node in the path removes the
last layer of encryption and forwards data to the destination. This layered
encryption scheme helps users to attain privacy and security as well as evade
censorship. The anonymity is directly related to the number of users in the
network and increases with the size of the population.
The Tor client is a free software and it is used to fetch the list of available
relay nodes from the directory server and to select a random path to the desti-
nation through the Tor network. Hence attackers can use this anonymization
network to launch attacks and hide behind the relay nodes. The intermediate
nodes can reside within the target network or outside it. Figure 3.2 depicts
the scenario where an attacker, in order to hide his identity, channels the
attack traffic through one gateway followed by one or more external stepping
stones back to the network through another gateway before attacking the
victim. In this case, it is important to correlate the connections carrying
attack traffic in order to identify and isolate the attacker and the stepping
1https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en
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stones.
Figure 3.2: Hiding identity behind an external stepping stone
3.1.4 Botnets as Stepping Stones
A botnet is a collection of hosts, which are typically geographically dis-
tributed, under the control of a hacker, and used mainly for malicious pur-
poses. Hosts become infected by malware like worms, Trojans or rootkits
that turn them into bots. Generally, the bot client is downloaded to the
host by Trojans or rootkits. The bot client communicates with one or more
command and control (C&C) servers. This communication is sometimes pre-
ceded by a DNS resolution phase. The C&C layer lies between the attacker
and the bots and is used to hide the attacker identity. This layer is responsi-
ble for relaying the commands from the attacker to the bots using protocols
like Internet Relay Chat (IRC) [22] and HTTP. Peer-to-peer botnets use pro-
tocols like Kademlia [26] to control the bots. These bots are used to launch
attacks such as distributed denial of service, spamming and port scanning.
Botnet-as-a-Service (BaaS) [4] is a new criminal service model which
enables attackers to rent a botnet or a subset of it from the botnet controller.
The attacker may launch attacks using the rented botnet as a launchpad.
The C&C proxy layer hides the identity of the attackers even if the botnet
is detected and taken down.
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3.2 Detection Techniques
Various studies have been conducted on how to effectively detect stepping
stones. As the attackers started using more advanced techniques like botnets
and anonymity networks, studies continued to identify bots and deanonymize
the attacker. Stepping stones can exist in legitimate computer systems and
people use stepping stones for regular activities. Studies show that some of
the existing detection techniques can erroneously identify legitimate Voice
over IP (VoIP) traffic [43] and gateways [15] as stepping stones. It is im-
portant to reduce these and other false-positive cases. It is also important
to identify legitimate and attack stepping stones and to analyze their traffic
patterns and other properties.
3.2.1 Content-Based Detection
Early studies [38, 46] focussed on analyzing the payload of packets to detect
stepping stones. Staniford-Chen and Heberlein proposed a thumbprint based
solution [38]. The thumbprints are very short summaries of contents over a
certain period in a connection, which are generated and stored at individual
nodes within the network. When an intrusion is detected, these thumbprints
are used to correlate connections and identify the chain of stepping stones.
The authors also identified the properties which thumbprints should have.
The effectiveness of the content-based detection techniques is limited by the
fact that connections can be encrypted between the intermediate stepping
stones.
3.2.2 Transmission Characteristic-Based Detection
Stepping stone detection techniques may rely on timing and size of packets
in different connections. Timing based approaches use various parameters
like inter-packet delay (IPD) and round-trip time (RTT).
Timing-based detection techniques Zhang and Paxson [55] proposed
a detection technique which relies on packet size and timing to correlate
connections in a chain of stepping stones in order to identify the stepping
stones. The timing-based algorithm tries to identify ON (data) and OFF (no
data) periods in a connection and is motivated by the spacing between human
keystrokes in an interactive terminal, which follows Pareto distribution. If
there is no data for time Tidle, then it signifies the onset of an OFF period.
An OFF period ends when the next data packet arrives. If the ending times
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of two OFF periods in two different connections differ by ≤ δ seconds, they
are said to be correlated. A constraint here is that the sink of one connection
should be the source of the other connection. Two different connections are
said to be correlated if
OFF 1,2
min(OFF 1,OFF 2)
≥ γ
where OFF 1,2 denotes the number of correlated OFF period endings, OFF 1
denotes the number of OFF periods of the first connection, OFF 2 denotes
the number of OFF periods of the second connection, and γ is a control
parameter. The study takes into account the causality constraint according
to which a packet can leave a node only after it arrives at the node. Some
other refinements relate to the consideration of consecutive correlated OFF
periods and reduce the number of false positives. The approach is unable
to distinguish legitimate stepping stones from ones used for attacks, which
results in a lot of false positives.
Yang and Huang [52] proposed a detection technique based on the anal-
ysis of the RTT of connections. As the length of a chain of stepping stones
increases, the RTT increases following a step function. Hence, the length
of the chain can be estimated by analyzing various RTT values. Other sim-
ilar detection techniques [39, 48] use principal component analysis, neural
networks, etc.
Packet count-based detection techniques He and Tong [20] proposed
a detection technique which does not depend on timing. They assumed that
the memory in any host is bounded, the timing delays are bounded and the
packets are ordered. They used a counting-based algorithm with linear time
complexity to detect stepping stones.
Thumbprinting Yang and Huang [51] proposed the idea of using tem-
poral thumbprints in detecting stepping stones. Temporal thumbprints or
T-thumbprints are sequences of temporal gaps between adjacent packets in
an interactive TCP connection. The real-time algorithm tries to correlate
T-thumbprints in order to identify consecutive connection pairs in a chain of
stepping stones.
Watermarking Wang et al. [46] proposed an active stepping stone de-
tection technique called Sleepy Watermark Tracing. When an intrusion is
detected, watermarks are injected into the backward connection and collab-
oration with routers along the chain of stepping stones leads to the identifi-
cation of the source of the chain. The technique does not use resources when
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no intrusion is detected. It can detect stepping stones even if no data is
transferred through the chain of connections. The watermarking technique
was later used by several other proposals [33, 35, 44].
Anomaly-based detection techniques Crescenzo et al. [11] argued that
active injection of jitter and chaff may decrease the chance of stepping stone
detection with the timing-based algorithm proposed by Zhang and Pax-
son [55] (see page 26). Jitter or delay of more than δ, when introduced
in at least one of the stepping stones, prevents the algorithm from correlat-
ing OFF periods. Typically δ is a time-span of a few milliseconds. Deliberate
injection of chaff packets, on the other hand, reduces the value of γ thus mak-
ing the algorithm ineffective. Hence, the algorithm should be complemented
by three anomaly detection techniques. Naive stepping stone attacks are
detected by the timing-based algorithm, while anomaly detection techniques
identify connections with jitter or chaff as anomalous.
Response-time based anomaly detection uses the fact that a packet in
the forward direction of a connection should be followed by a packet in the
reverse direction within some time window. The method marks connections
as anomalous (due to jitter) when they do not follow this principle. Edit-
distance based anomaly detection builds on the idea that the sequence of ON
and OFF periods in the forward direction of a connection should be similar
to the sequence in the backward direction and have low edit-distance values.
Injecting chaff packets results in the increase of this distance value and leads
to the identification of anomalous connections. Causality based anomaly
detection is based on the idea that, in a normal interactive connection, every
pair of consecutive ON periods in the forward direction of the connection
is associated with exactly one ON period in the backward direction, and
vice versa. This detection technique can identify connections with chaff as
anomalous.
3.2.3 Deanonymization Techniques
There are ways to deanonymize anonymous network traffic. For example,
in case of Tor networks, if an observer can view the traffic on the first link
(between user and the first Tor relay) and on the last link (between the Tor
exit node and the destination), the traffic can be correlated based on timing. 2
2https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en
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3.2.4 Novel Techniques for Botnet Detection
Deep packet inspection Deep packet inspection includes header scan-
ning, payload scanning, knowledge of various protocol (IRC, HTTP, etc.) se-
mantics and classification based on this knowledge. BotHunter [17] identifies
bots by mapping the activities to various stages observed in a bot life-cycle.
BotSniffer [18] aims to identify communication of bots with C&C servers.
Tools exist to classify network applications and map malicious activities in
order to detect bots.
Scanning traffic Botnets with peer-to-peer communications for C&C may
be detected using tools like BotMiner [16], which rely on correlating peer-to-
peer communication with malicious activities. The tool identifies clusters of
hosts with similar peer-to-peer communication and clusters from activities
like port scanning and spamming. These clusters are then correlated to
identify botnets. The tool uses Snort [37], an intrusion detection system, to
detect the malicious activities.
DNS based detection There are various DNS based botnet detection
techniques of varying complexity. Villamar´ın-Salomo´n and Brustoloni [42]
used Bayesian probability theory to identify bots of the same botnet by ana-
lyzing the DNS queries they make over time. Choi et al. [7] identified bots by
clustering hosts based on similarities in their DNS queries. Yadav et al. [50]
focused on detecting domain flux techniques used by various botnets. Domain
flux is a technique to dynamically generate domain names that identify C&C
servers or proxies. The domain names can range from random alphanumeric
strings to dictionary words. In the former case, the detection techniques rely
on the fact that the distribution of alphanumeric characters are different in
randomly generated strings and normal domain names. In the latter case,
multiple metrics are required. Another study [12] shows ways to detect C&C
communication that is tunnelled through DNS messages.
Spam-bot detection Botnets are often used to send spam emails, and this
property can be used to identify the bots. A study by Xie et al. [49] focuses on
identifying URLs in spam emails. Obfuscated URLs are detected by regular
expression validators. Another study [14] aims to identify C&C servers after
detecting the spamming bots. This study tries to model legitimate emails
and spam emails and identify spams based on the distance to these models.
Communication analysis A study [23] on communication analysis for
botnet detection relies on the ports to which individual hosts connect, fan-in
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patterns, flow models of IRC and HTTP communications, and periodicity of
communications. Another study [28] analyzes random walks in communica-
tion graphs and is mostly concerned with P2P C&C communication.
Detection using SDN A study [47] in this area has proposed a botnet
detection technique specific to the architecture of SDN and the separation
of data plane and control plane. The botnet detection components consist
of generic templates, flow collector, multistage filtering, bot detection engine
and attack prevention. The system uses IPFIX and customized templates
for capturing useful flow information at the switches. The flow collector uses
customized storage templates for storing the flow records reported by the
switches. The multistage filtering is a five-stage process that filters out in-
formation related to normal traffic. The botnet detection engine uses various
machine learning techniques in order to identify botnets with varying com-
munication patterns. Both spatial and temporal communication patterns
are taken into consideration to detect bots as well as botnets. The attack
prevention component isolates an identified bot by configuring access control
policies in the OpenFlow switch.
3.2.5 Legitimate Stepping Stone Detection
Users sometime use stepping stones legitimately for various activities. Not
all chains of stepping stones are created with malicious intent. These cases
need to be filtered out in stepping stone detection mechanisms which trig-
ger a response, such as isolation of the stepping stones or the first node in
the chain. A relevant study [10] has proposed an anomaly-based legitimate
stepping stone connection detection technique to be used in conjunction with
the prevalent timing-based detection techniques in order to reduce the false
positive rate. The study uses a component that stores information regarding
normal behaviour and provides reference data to the anomaly detection com-
ponent. The study fails to document further details regarding the reference
data and what information might be useful to construct such reference data.
Chapter 4
Timing-Based Detection in SDN
and NFV
SDN and NFV are technologies that will be heavily used in future commu-
nication networks, and it is important to enable techniques for monitoring
them. As discussed in Chapter 2, the architecture is different from that of
traditional networks. The data plane and the control plane of an SDN are
separated, and the network relies heavily on virtualized network functions.
Stepping stone attacks are also possible in these new environments. The
packets between consecutive stepping stones flow through the switches in
the data plane programmed by the controller.
Challenges The challenge is that, in SDN, the often used south-bound pro-
tocols (e.g. OpenFlow [3]) are not suitable for traffic monitoring. The con-
troller can gather flow-level statistics using these protocols but cannot gather
useful monitoring information on individual connections. Instead, one has to
use protocols such as NetFlow/IPFIX and sFlow to gain detailed knowledge
about the traffic passing through the individual switches in the data plane.
As discussed already in Chapter 2, sFlow is more scalable than the other
alternatives. Switches can be configured to sample header information at a
specific rate and to forward that information to a collector. Regarding step-
ping stone detection, the challenges include removing redundancy from the
collected data, identifying connections and ON/OFF periods of those con-
nections from the sampled data, and correlating connections based on the
collected information.
In this chapter, we explain the packet sampling and timing-based detection
of stepping stones. We also set the evaluation goals of our experiments
and present the implementation details. We also discuss about the various
31
CHAPTER 4. TIMING-BASED DETECTION IN SDN AND NFV 32
network topologies which we have considered in our experiments and the
sFlow security model in general.
4.1 Packet Sampling and Timing-Based De-
tection
We rely on the switches in the data plane for sampling packets and forwarding
header information to a central collection and analysis module. The switches
should be able to operate at varying packet sampling rates. We aim at
real-time identification of stepping stones and, hence, it is important for
the switches to immediately forward the sampled information to the analysis
module. Any delay will have considerable impact on the detection procedure.
Therefore, a packet sampling and reporting mechanism with no caching and
delay is preferred.
4.1.1 Timing-Based Detection
The sampled header information is analyzed to identify stepping stones by
correlating connections. First the ON and OFF periods of connections are
identified. Then these periods of different connections are correlated. The
connections should be consecutive, i.e., the source of one connection should
be the destination of another connection. Finally, consecutive connections
are correlated based on the period correlation. The analyzer module uses the
same sampled header information to identify connections that are anomalous
due to jitter and chaff.
Identification of ON/OFF periods As discussed in Chapter 3, inter-
active connections can be structured into ON (data) and OFF (no data)
periods based on keystroke spacing of the user which can be described by
a Pareto distribution. It has been observed [32] that 25% of keystrokes are
500 milliseconds or more apart. Similar to the solution proposed by [55], we
consider a connection to enter an OFF period when there is no data for Tidle.
An OFF period ends and an ON period begins when the first data packet
arrives after the onset of the OFF period. When inter-packet spacing is less
than Tidle, each data packet contributes to the size of the content transferred
in the corresponding ON period.
Correlating ON/OFF periods Zhang et al. [55] proposed that two OFF
periods of two different connections are correlated if their ending times differ
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by a value≤ δ milliseconds. As the connections are characterized by alternate
ON and OFF periods, there is no difference in correlation based on the ending
times of OFF periods or the starting times of ON periods. In our study, two
ON periods of two different connections are correlated if their starting times
differ by a value ≤ δ seconds. While correlating ON periods, we order the
pair of ON periods {a, b} by a happens after relationship. In this case, b
happens after a, that is, the ON period b starts no later than δ seconds after
the onset of ON period a. We do not correlate ON periods of the forward
and reverse legs of the same connection.
Correlating connections The timing-based correlation score of two con-
nections is given by
ON 1,2
min(ON 1,ON 2)
where ON 1,2 denotes the number of correlated ON period starts, ON 1 de-
notes the number of ON periods of the first connection and ON 2 denotes
the number of ON periods of the second connection. The first and second
connections are ordered by the happens after relationship between their ON
periods as discussed above. The content-size based correlation score is based
on the idea that, for two correlated connections, if the content size increases
from one ON period to the next of one connection, it would increase cor-
respondingly for the other connection. For this purpose, we only consider
those pairs of ON periods which are correlated. The score is given by
Matches found
Number of correlated ON period pairs − 1
Two connections are identified as correlated if both
timing-based correlation score ≥ γtiming
and
content-size based correlation score ≥ γcontent-size
where γtiming and γcontent-size are tunable parameters.
Handling jitter and chaff We aim to adapt the anomaly-based jitter and
chaff detection techniques proposed by Crescenzo et al. [11] to the environ-
ment under consideration. Response-time based anomaly detection, used for
detecting deliberately inserted jitter in the attack traffic, does not work in a
sampled environment as the technique relies on mapping each packet in the
forward leg of a connection with its response in the reverse leg of the same
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connection based on round trip times calculated using the Jacobson-Karel’s
algorithm [21]. In an environment that relies heavily on sampling, this map-
ping cannot be effectively performed. Edit-distance based anomaly detection
and causality based anomaly detection, as discussed in Chapter 3, can be
adapted to this environment because of the fact that these chaff detection
techniques rely on analyzing ON and OFF periods in interactive connections
rather than individual packets and their responses.
De-anonymization We aim to de-anonymize an attacker who uses an
anonymity network to hide his identity. If the victim host and the attacker
host both lie within the network while the anonymity network is external to
the network, the first link and the last link in the chain of stepping stones
can be monitored. If these two links can be correlated considering the sec-
tion of intermediate nodes and links as a black box, the attacker can be
de-anonymized. Hence we aim to correlate any arbitrary pair of connections
and analyze the correlations. End-to-end deanonymization is more difficult
than step-by-step correlation because jitter accumulates along the path, but
it requires fewer sampling points in the network.
4.2 Evaluation Goals
Evaluation goals of our experiments are as follows:
• Estimate values of Tidle for which sufficient number of ON/OFF periods
of a connection can be identified in different network topologies for
varying packet sampling rates.
• Estimate values of δ for which ON/OFF periods as well as connections
can be effectively correlated in different network topologies for varying
packet sampling rates.
• Verify whether the γtiming value of 0.3 (as estimated by Zhang et al. [55])
is correct for identifying correlated connections.
• Estimate γcontent-size value for effective content-size based correlation.
• Analyze the effectiveness of edit-distance based and causality-based
chaff detection techniques in different network topologies for varying
packet sampling rates.
• Evaluate the possibility of de-anonymization by correlating arbitrary
connection pairs in different network topologies for varying packet sam-
pling rates.
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4.3 Implementation Details
Emulation Environment We used Mininet1 as the primary tool for emu-
lating the necessary environment. Mininet is a popular tool for experimenting
with SDN and OpenFlow and runs virtual hosts, switches and links on top
of the same operating system kernel. Although the components are created
with software rather than real hardware, real network behaviour can be repli-
cated in this virtual environment. It is possible to create different network
topologies and to ssh [53] to the virtual hosts. The virtual switches support
OpenFlow as well as sFlow protocols.
sFlow packet sampling fits our implementation as the switches immedi-
ately forward the sampled header information without caching. The sFlow
sampling rate and polling rate can be configured for the switches. These
rates can be adjusted to fit the type of the network (bandwidth, traffic vol-
ume, etc.) so that the sFlow collector is not flooded with sFlow datagrams.
As different sampling rates are used, the probability that a packet travers-
ing a specific switch will be sampled and reported to the collector varies.
For example, if the sampling rate is 1 in s packets, then the probability of
a particular packet getting sampled is 1/s. Hence, if packets have to pass
through n switches on average, the probability of a packet being sampled in
at least one of the n switches is 1− ((s− 1)/s)n which increases with n for a
fixed value of s. On the other hand, for a fixed average number of switches
n, the probability of a packet being sampled in at least one of the switches
decreases with increase in the sampling rate s.
There is also a related trade-off which should be considered while design-
ing network monitoring systems for SDN environments. If the probability of
a packet being sampled increases beyond a threshold, it may result in flood-
ing at the sFlow collector and hence reduce the scalability of the system.
Hence, monitoring strategies have to be devised which can gain sufficient
insight from sampled data and make the monitoring system truly scalable.
Technologies used Mininet uses by default a reference controller which
installs flow entries to the flow tables of the switches through the SBI. We
require a framework to monitor the network in order to identify the stepping
stones as OpenFlow counter values do not provide sufficient information.
Hence, an sFlow controller is needed to gather traffic-related metadata from
the switches (sFlow agents). We used Node.js2 to implement the sFlow con-
1http://mininet.org/
2https://nodejs.org/en/
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troller and MongoDB3 as the forensic data store for traffic data.
In our study, we have used Mininet 2.2.1, Open vSwitch 2.0.2, OpenFlow
1.0 and sFlow 5.0. For the forensic data store we have used MongoDB 3.2.4.
Implementation As shown by Figure 4.1, the sFlow controller can be
logically divided into two different modules: the sFlow collector and the
data analyzer. The modules interact with the forensic data store to store
and retrieve traffic data and to store correlation information. An application
can retrieve information about correlations and stepping stones from the
forensic data store.
We implemented two different versions of the data analyzer. The ver-
sion which is discussed here detects stepping stones in real-time based on
the sFlow datagrams forwarded by the sFlow capable switches in the net-
work. Another version of our application analyses captured network traces,
simulates sFlow sampling and identifies stepping stones.
Figure 4.1: The architecture.
The sFlow agents embedded in switches can be configured to modify the
sampling and polling rates. The sFlow agent extracts header information
3https://www.mongodb.org/
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from the sampled packets, marshals the header information into sFlow data-
grams and sends the datagrams immediately to the sFlow collector. The
sFlow collector module extracts the header information from the sFlow data-
grams and stores the information in a data-store to be used by the data-
analysis module in order to correlate connections and detect stepping-stones.
The data-analysis module works on the traffic data collected by the data-
collection module. It fetches the raw traffic data comprised of header in-
formation and removes redundancy introduced by multiple sFlow agents in
the path of a packet sending the same header information. Then it tries
to match these headers with existing connections between the hosts. Once
the matching has been done, the header information is used to update the
connection data. The individual connection information is used to correlate
the connections. The knowledge gained by this module can be used by an
intrusion prevention system (IPS) application, which may instruct the SDN
controller to isolate stepping stones and to restrict traffic generated at these
stepping stones.
The forensic data store stores the necessary information for forensic anal-
ysis of the data. Although the header information received by the collector
module gets temporarily stored here, the data store gets rid of unnecessary
data and stores only meaningful data like period correlation information and
connection correlation information, which can act as evidence in forensic
analysis.
4.4 Topologies and Sampling Rates
Figure 4.2: Single Switch or Star Topology
We consider four different topologies in our experiments: single switch or
star topology, tree topology, linear topology and clos topology. The average
number of switches between two hosts varies between the topologies. If the
sFlow packet sampling rate is set to 1 in n packets and the average number of
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switches between two end hosts is s, then the probability of a packet getting
sampled in at least one of the switches is 1− (n− 1
n
)s
.
In the single switch or star topology of Figure 4.2, every packet has to
traverse a single switch before it can get delivered to the destination host.
Hence, if the sFlow packet sampling rate is 1 in n packets, the probability of
an individual packet getting sampled is 1/n.
Figure 4.3: Tree Topology
In the tree topology of Figure 4.3, we have used h1, h3, h2 and h4 as
the consecutive hops in our experiments. Hence, every packet has to traverse
through 3 switches before it gets delivered to the destination host. If the
sFlow packet sampling rate is 1 in n packets, the probability of a packet
getting sampled in at least one of the 3 switches is 1− (n− 1
n
)3
.
Figure 4.4: Linear Topology
In the linear topology of Figure 4.4, if host h1 sends a packet to host
h5, the packet traverses through 5 switches and hence the probability of it
getting sampled is 1− (n− 1
n
)5
when the packet sampling rate is set to 1 in
n packets.
In the clos topology of Figure 4.5, there are 5 switches between host h1
and h7 along any of the possible paths. Hence, following the same argument
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Figure 4.5: Clos Topology
as in the case of linear topology, the probability of a packet sent from h1 to
h7 getting sampled is 1− (n− 1
n
)5
when the packet sampling rate is set to
1 in n packets.
4.5 sFlow Security
The deployment of network monitoring raises a number of security issues
which need to be addressed. sFlow does not have any security mechanism
and relies on proper deployment and configuration.
sFlow traffic is sent unencrypted to the collector. Casual eavesdropping
as well as spoofing of datagrams are possible. To eliminate these issues,
sFlow datagrams should be sent through an isolated channel. VLAN or VPN
tunnels can be used to create these secure isolated channels. The solution
is deployment specific and in our experiments we have simply forwarded the
unencrypted traffic through the network to the collector. However, in our
implementation, we check the sequence numbers of the headers encapsulated
in the sFlow datagrams to remove possible redundancy or spoofed packets.
Analysis of the sFlow datagrams can reveal sensitive information about
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the network activities of a user. Although sampling of packets at the switches
and limiting the number of header bytes encapsulated by the sFlow datagram
prevents leakage of sensitive information to some extent, only the network ad-
ministrators with proper rights should be allowed to access the forensic data
store for forensic analysis. Nevertheless, network monitoring itself makes the
network more robust and less vulnerable to attacks.
Chapter 5
Results
In this chapter we present the results gathered while experimenting with
stepping stone detection in different network topologies and varying sFlow
packet sampling rates. Each experiment is run 100 times and the graphs plot
results with 3 bars. The middle bar represents the average while the upper
and lower bars depict the range in 95% of the cases.
5.1 Identification of ON/OFF Periods
From Figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4, it is evident that the number of ON
periods for a specific volume of traffic decreases with an increase in Tidle in
the different topologies. Nevertheless, a Tidle value of 500 milliseconds leads
to the identification of sufficient number of ON periods in the tree, linear
and clos topologies. Even though the number of ON periods for Tidle set to
500 milliseconds is less than 10 in this specific case of the star topology, the
value should be high enough for effective analysis of interactions done over
considerable periods of time.
It is also evident that the number of ON periods increases with the in-
crease in the number of sampling switches between two stepping-stone hosts.
In our experiments, the packet sampling rate was set to 1/10. For packet
sampling rate of 1/1, with the same generated traffic, 15 ON periods were
identified when Tidle was set to 500 milliseconds. We attribute the increase
in the number of ON periods for packet sampling rate of 1/10 in most of
the topologies to the fact that some packets within a longer ON period were
not sampled by any of the switches, which divided the single ON period into
multiple smaller ON and OFF periods.
41
CHAPTER 5. RESULTS 42
0
10
20
30
40
50
Single Switch Topology
h1 → h2
T_idle ( in milliseconds )
N
um
be
r o
f O
N
 P
er
io
ds
100 200 300 500
Figure 5.1: Effect of varying Tidle on the number of ON periods of connections
for single switch or star topology. Packet sampling rate is 1/10.
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Figure 5.2: Effect of varying Tidle on the number of ON periods of connections
for tree topology. Packet sampling rate is 1/10.
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Figure 5.3: Effect of varying Tidle on the number of ON periods of connections
for linear topology. Packet sampling rate is 1/10.
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Figure 5.4: Effect of varying Tidle on the number of ON periods of connections
for clos topology. Packet sampling rate is 1/10.
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5.2 Correlation of ON Periods
In Figures 5.5 and 5.6, we present the observed number of correlated ON
periods between two consecutive connections in a chain of stepping stones
in a tree topology. Here the attacker hops from host h1 to h2 and then to
h3 and generates attack traffic. The number of correlated ON periods in
consecutive connections h1→ h2 and h2→ h3 increases with the increase in
δ. In the non-sampled case, low values of δ in the range of 1-3 milliseconds are
sufficient to correlate ON periods. With a packet sampling rate of 1/10, a δ
of 100 milliseconds is necessary to identify correlations between ON periods.
Nevertheless, higher values of δ should be avoided in order to keep the false
positive rate low.
0
3
6
9
12
15
Tree Topology
h1 → h3 → h2; Packet Sampling Rate: 1/1
δ ( in milliseconds )
N
um
be
r o
f C
or
re
la
te
d 
O
N
 P
er
io
ds
1 2 3
Figure 5.5: Effect of varying δ on the correlation of ON periods in a tree
topology. Tidle is 500 milliseconds.
In Figures 5.7 and 5.8, we observe the number of correlated ON periods
for attack traffic trace generated in a clos topology. Here the attacker hops
from host h1 to h7 and then to h3. From the graphs, we can observe that
the number of correlations of ON periods between consecutive connections
h1→ h7 and h7→ h3 increases with the value of δ. When packet sampling
rate is 1/1, the correlation is quite high for very low values of δ similar to the
tree topology. Also, when packet sampling rate is set to 1/10, the number of
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Figure 5.6: Effect of varying δ on the correlation of ON periods in a tree
topology. Tidle is 500 milliseconds.
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Figure 5.7: Effect of varying δ on the correlation of ON periods in a clos
topology. Tidle is 500 milliseconds.
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Figure 5.8: Effect of varying δ on the correlation of ON periods in a clos
topology. Tidle is 500 milliseconds.
correlations is high for δ value of 100 milliseconds. Hence, the observations
are similar for the tree and clos topologies and can provide us with possible
values of δ to be used in different topologies and sampling rates.
5.3 Timing Based Correlation
The timing-based correlation score of two consecutive connections in a step-
ping stone chain in a tree topology increases with δ as depicted in Figures 5.9
and 5.10. The attacker hops from host h1 to h2 and then to h3. The timing-
based correlation scores for the two consecutive connections h1 → h2 and
h2→ h3 in the non-sampled case are higher than the threshold γtiming value
of 0.3 for δ in the range of 1 to 3 milliseconds. 1 being the highest possible
value, the correlation score saturates for δ value of 2 milliseconds at a high
value of 0.867. For packet sampling rate of 1/10, the scores are much lower
even for much higher δ values but increase monotonically with δ. For δ set
to 100 milliseconds or more, the correlation score lies above γtiming and the
connections are correlated.
From Figures 5.11 and 5.12, it is evident that running similar experiments
in the clos topology results in observations similar to the tree topology. The
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Figure 5.9: Effect of varying δ on the timing based correlation score in a tree
topology. Tidle is 500 milliseconds.
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Figure 5.10: Effect of varying δ on the timing based correlation score in a
tree topology. Tidle is 500 milliseconds.
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Figure 5.11: Effect of varying δ on the timing based correlation score in a
clos topology. Tidle is 500 milliseconds.
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Figure 5.12: Effect of varying δ on the timing based correlation score in a
clos topology. Tidle is 500 milliseconds.
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timing-based correlation score is above the threshold value (γtiming) of 0.3 for
very low values of δ in the range of 1-3 milliseconds when packet sampling rate
is 1/1. Hence correlated connections could be effectively identified. When
sFlow packet sampling rate is set to 1/10, effective correlation is possible for
δ values of 100 milliseconds and higher. We should keep in mind that very
high values of δ, on the other hand, leads to increase in the rate of false
positives and should be avoided.
5.4 Content-Size Based Correlation
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Figure 5.13: Content-size based correlation score for related and unrelated
connections.
Content-size based correlation is used as a second check in order to reduce
the number of false positives. Even if two unrelated connections generate a
very high timing based correlation score, it is unlikely that the content sizes
over the ON periods would show a similar pattern for the connections. Fig-
ure 5.13 presents the graph which depicts that this additional measure is
effective and the differences in scores between unrelated and related connec-
tions is high. In case of connections which are unrelated, the score lies near
to the ideal value of 0.5 with an average score of 0.627 in the 95th percentile.
In case of related connections the average content-size based correlation score
is 0.894 which is near the ideal score of 1. These observations motivate us
to set the threshold value γcontent-size for content-size based correlation to
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0.8. Connection pairs should be marked as correlated if and only if both the
timing-based correlation score and the content-size based correlation score
lie above the defined thresholds.
5.5 Edit-Distance Based Chaff Detection
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Figure 5.14: Edit distance based chaff detection in sampled and non-sampled
environments in tree topology.
Edit-distance of an interactive connection is high if the attacker inserts
chaff in the traffic. The threshold distance is 1 and a connection is marked
as anomalous due to chaff if the observed edit-distance is more than this
threshold. In our experiments, the attacker establishes an ssh session in a
tree topology from host h1 to h4 using intermediate hosts h3 and h2 as
the stepping stones. The attacker then introduces chaff in the connection
h3→ h2 in the stepping stone chain h1→ h3→ h2→ h4. The same attack
traffic trace is fed to our application for both sampled and non-sampled cases.
We run our experiments for traffic with chaff and no chaff. As depicted in
Figure 5.14, the detection technique is able to identify anomalous connections
effectively in a tree topology. The difference between the edit distances when
there is chaff and when there is no chaff is higher when packet sampling rate
is 1/1. Nevertheless, even when the sFlow packet sampling rate is set to
1/10, the edit-distance lies above the threshold when there is chaff.
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Figure 5.15: Edit distance based chaff detection in sampled and non-sampled
environments in clos topology.
In clos topology (Figure 5.15), we ran similar experiments. Here the step-
ping stone chain is h1→ h7→ h3→ h5 and chaff is deliberately introduced
in the attack traffic at h7→ h3. Observations are similar to those in the tree
topology, and the edit distances for the connection h7 → h3 lie above the
threshold distance of 1 when there is chaff in the attack traffic. The differ-
ence of scores in case of chaff and no chaff is smaller when the sFlow packet
sampling rate is set to 1/10 but the detection mechanism is still effective
enough to mark connections with chaff as anomalous.
5.6 Causality Based Chaff Detection
Causality based anomaly score of an interactive connection is low if there
is exactly one ON period in the reverse leg of the connection between two
consecutive ON periods in the forward leg and vice versa. When the attacker
inserts chaff in the attack traffic, the score increases and the connection is
marked as anomalous once the score rises above the threshold value of 0.67.
We executed the detection mechanism on captured attack traffic trace in the
same way as discussed in the previous section on edit-distance based chaff
detection. As evident from Figure 5.16 and 5.17, the detection technique
is effective when the packet sampling rate is 1/1 and the connections with
injected chaff are marked anomalous. When the sFlow packet sampling rate
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Figure 5.16: Causality based chaff detection in sampled and non-sampled
environments in tree topology.
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Figure 5.17: Causality based chaff detection in sampled and non-sampled
environments in clos topology.
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is 1/10, this detection technique is ineffective and the anomaly score lies
below the threshold value even in positive cases. Hence, when lower packet
sampling rates are enabled, edit-distance based chaff detection mechanism
should be implemented in order to effectively detect anomalous connections
with injected chaff.
5.7 De-anonymization
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Figure 5.18: Effect of varying δ on the timing based correlation score of two
non-consecutive connections in a stepping stone chain in a tree topology. Tidle
is set to 500 milliseconds.
We tried to correlate first (h1 → h3) and last connection (h2 → h4)
in a chain of stepping stones (h1 → h3 → h2 → h4) in a tree topology.
Figures 5.18 and 5.19 present the timing based correlation scores in the 95th
percentile for the first and last connections when sFlow packet sampling is
1/10 and 1/1. When packet sampling rate is 1/1, the timing-based correlation
scores are higher than the threshold value (γtiming) of 0.3 for positive cases for
very small values of δ in the range of 1-3 milliseconds. However, when packet
sampling rate is 1/10, the timing-based correlation scores do not rise above
the threshold value even for higher values of δ like 100 and 200 milliseconds.
In the clos topology, we tried to correlate the first and last links in a
chain of connections h1 → h7 → h3 → h5 in a similar way. When sFlow
packet sampling rate is 1/1, the connections h1 → h7 and h3 → h5 are
CHAPTER 5. RESULTS 54
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
De-anonymization (Packet Sampling Rate: 1/10)
Tree Topology: h1 → h3 → h2 → h4; Correlation between h1 → h3 and h2 → h4
δ ( in milliseconds )
Ti
m
in
g 
Ba
se
d 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Sc
or
e
50 100 200
Threshold 
(γ) = 0.3
Figure 5.19: Effect of varying δ on the timing based correlation score of two
non-consecutive connections in a stepping stone chain in a tree topology. Tidle
is set to 500 milliseconds.
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Figure 5.20: Effect of varying δ on the timing based correlation score of two
non-consecutive connections in a stepping stone chain in a clos topology. Tidle
is set to 500 milliseconds.
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Figure 5.21: Effect of varying δ on the timing based correlation score of two
non-consecutive connections in a stepping stone chain in a clos topology. Tidle
is set to 500 milliseconds.
effectively correlated with timing-based correlation scores lying above the
threshold value of 0.3 for low values of δ in the range of 1-3 milliseconds.
When sFlow packet sampling rate is 1/10, the timing-based correlation score
lies above the threshold value of 0.3 for δ set to 200 milliseconds. Hence,
for high values of δ, we can effectively correlate a pair of non-consecutive
connections in sampled environments. But we should keep in mind that high
values of δ also leads to higher rates of false positives.
Chapter 6
Discussions
In this chapter we discuss the results presented in the previous chapter. We
try to find out the significance of the results along with the shortcomings.
We also discuss possible future work in this field.
6.1 Significance of the Results
Detection based on sufficient data Consecutive connections in stepping
stone chains were effectively detected in the different topologies for sFlow
packet sampling rates of 1/1 and 1/10. The numbers of detected ON periods
and correlated ON periods were sufficient to identify stepping stones.
Content-size based second level check Content-size based correlation
reduces the number of false positives. This technique correlates the content
sizes of two connections’ correlated ON periods. A low correlation score in-
dicates that timing-based detection may have generated a false positive case.
This technique is a new proposal and was not part of the previous solu-
tions. This additional step in the detection mechanism reduces the chances
of generating false positive alarms.
Effective detection of anomaly due to chaff Edit-distance as well as
causality based chaff detection techniques adapt well to the SDN environment
when sFlow packet sampling rate is 1/1. For lower packet sampling rate of
1/10, causality based chaff detection becomes ineffective. Edit-distance based
chaff detection is, however, effective even in this case.
De-anonymization is a possibility In our experiments, the stepping-
stone detection techniques effectively correlate non-consecutive connections
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in a chain of stepping stones when sFlow packet sampling rate is 1/1. When
sFlow packet sampling rate is 1/10, the timing-based correlation score for
non-consecutive connections falls below the threshold value in the tree topol-
ogy. However, in the clos topology the timing-based technique effectively cor-
relates non-consecutive connections in a chain of stepping stones. The reason
for this phenomenon is that, in our experiments, there are fewer switches be-
tween two consecutive stepping stones in the tree topology than in the clos
topology. For packet sampling rates less than 1/1, the probability of a packet
getting sampled at least once increases with the number of switches between
the host and the destination. We should keep in mind that clos is a more
realistic topology than the tree topology in data-center networks.
Application to non-interactive network traffic As discussed in 3.1.2,
attackers can steal video streams by compromising the storage device in a
network. Delta-compressed video streams generate a traffic pattern which,
although non-interactive in nature, exhibits ON (data) and OFF (no data)
periods. Hence, the same detection techniques can be applied to identify the
stepping stone, which in this case is the compromised host, by correlating
consecutive connections in the chain. This can be used to detect that the
video stream is leaking out to the Internet.
6.2 Limitations
Impact of packet sampling on the stepping stone and anomaly de-
tection techniques The timing and content-size based stepping stone de-
tection techniques as well as the edit-distance and causality based chaff detec-
tion techniques are affected by sFlow sampling. When the packet sampling
rate is set to 1/10, the scores of these detection techniques decrease in all the
topologies. In large networks, sFlow packet sampling rates must be much
lower than 1/10 to reduce monitoring traffic.
Lack of incorporation of specifics of SDN and NFV environment
In our solution, we have not used any property of SDN or NFV which helps
in making these detection techniques more effective. Rather, our approach
has been naive in trying to find out ways in which existing solutions can be
adapted to this new environment. sFlow is a protocol used for monitoring
networks in general, and we have used it here alongside OpenFlow. It might
be possible to develop new techniques that integrate fully with the SDN and
NFV environments.
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Limited scalability of the solution We have assumed in our study that
a single sFlow collector module will be able to accept all sFlow datagrams
sent from the switches in the network and that a single analyzer module will
be able to effectively detect all correlations in real-time. In large networks,
this might not be the case, and a more scalable solution would be required.
Multiple collector and analyzer modules may need to work in parallel on
the same forensic data store. Even the data store itself may have to be
distributed.
Use of data store leads to lot of disk accesses The forensic data store
was implemented using MongoDB, which is accessed by both the collector
and analyzer modules. This leads to a lot of disk access. Use of a distributed
memory-based caching system like memcached1 may reduce the latency of
disk access.
Continuous bandwidth consumption Our implementation is based on
the idea of continuous network monitoring in order to collect forensic data
related to the correlation of connections. This results in continuous consump-
tion of network bandwidth as the switches forward sFlow datagrams to the
collector. If more of the processing was done at the switches, the bandwidth
requirements could be radically reduced.
Lack of real traces and estimate of false positives We simulated
stepping stone attacks in different topologies with Mininet. The collected
traffic trace was used to analyze the effectiveness of the implemented stepping
stone detection techniques. Real attack traces in SDN environments would
have increased the accuracy of our results.
The stepping stone detection techniques do not differentiate between at-
tackers and stepping stones in legitimate communication. False positive in
our study means two uncorrelated connections reported by the detection
mechanisms to be correlated. In our experiments, we did not find a single
false positive case. However, if we also considered stepping stones in legiti-
mate communication as false positives, there would be many cases.
Moreover, we found a large number of false negative cases for sFlow sam-
pling rates lower than 1/1. Also, causality based anomaly detection mech-
anism, unlike edit-distance based anomaly detection mechanism, becomes
ineffective at lower sFlow sampling rates and does not mark connections as
anomalous even in the presence of chaff in the network traffic.
1https://memcached.org/
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6.3 Future Work
Scalability The solution can be modified to be more scalable. One can de-
sign distributed collector and analyzer modules. In that case, a distributed
co-ordination mechanism should be implemented in order to synchronize
these applications. Distributed memory cache like memcached can be used
to reduce the number of disk accesses by the distributed applications.
Reactive design As we have observed, detection of correlated connection
pairs is more efficient at higher packet sampling rates. The detection mecha-
nisms perform poorly when the packet sampling rate is reduced. In order to
solve this problem, it is important to identify alternative mechanisms to col-
lect useful information. For example, one may try to incorporate the sFlow
polling mechanism or counter values from OpenFlow in the solution. The
challenge is that it is easy to collect data at the flow level but difficult to
collect data about individual connections within aggregate flows.
Figure 6.1: IDS triggered reactive stepping stone detection mechanism
An alternative solution might be to make the stepping stone detection
mechanism reactive as shown in Figure 6.1. One can use triggered stepping
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stone detection instead of continuous monitoring. The deployed IDS, on
detection of an attack in an end host, triggers the stepping stone detection
mechanisms and enables sFlow forwarding in the switches. For a short period
of time, the switches forward all header information to the collector to be
analyzed by the analyzer module. Once the chain of stepping stones is identi-
fied or the detection mechanism times out, sFlow reporting is disabled in the
switches and the detection applications are deactivated. Nevertheless, this
scheme might generate a huge amount of redundant traffic in a very short
period of time if not efficiently designed. For example, in a clos topology
(Figure 4.5) all traffic between hosts passes through the access layer switches
or the switches closest to the hosts. Hence, it should be sufficient to enable
sFlow in these switches only, thus saving bandwidth. This reduces generated
network traffic. Further, an intelligent optimized scheme might be designed
to selectively enable sFlow reporting in the switches to assist the stepping
stone detection mechanisms.
Botnet detection In our current study, we have only considered detec-
tion of stepping stones where the traffic is interactive. Botnets, as already
discussed in Chapter 3, can also be used by attacker to launch attacks in a
network, and there are various existing techniques to detect bots and bot-
nets. The proposed architecture can be used to analyze the sampled header
information, which might reveal potential bot activities and trigger botnet
detection mechanisms in SDN and NFV environments.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
In a network of connected hosts, attackers may hop from one compromised
host to the other to form a chain of stepping stones before attacking the
victim. Stepping stone detection techniques exist to identify the attacker
by tracing back through the chain of stepping stones. There are content-
matching based [38, 46] active and passive detection techniques for un-encrypted
traffic. With the advent of secure shell or SSH, various timing based detec-
tion techniques [1, 45, 54, 55] have been proposed. Furthermore, the attackers
may try to avoid the detection. For this reason, Crescenzo et al. [11] proposed
various anomaly detection techniques to mark connections with deliberately
inserted jitter and chaff as anomalous. All of these detection techniques work
on interactive traffic where the attacker uses remote terminal sessions to hop
from one host to the next.
Stepping stone attacks are still relevant in today’s world of automated
botnets and malware. In advanced persistent threats or APTs, the attacker
spends a lot of time exploring the target network only to steal critical data.
In APTs and similar attacks, the attacker often exploits vulnerabilities in a
server or host that is within the target network but accessible from outside,
compromises it, and uses it as a stepping stone to gain more knowledge o the
internals of the network and to launch new attacks. Another typical scenario
could be an attacker hijacking live video steams (Figure 3.1) from camera
devices and using a compromised host in the target network to relay them to
the outside. Here the traffic pattern is also similar to interactive traffic with
ON/OFF periods due to the delta compression of the video streams.
SDN and NFV are new avenues of computer networks currently being
adopted by the industry. They make the networks programmable and easy
to manage. In this study, we investigated how to adapt the stepping stone
detection techniques to fit this new model of networks. For network monitor-
ing, we used the sFlow protocol. In our simulations, we used sFlow enabled
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Open vSwitches as the forwarding elements. We presented an SDN-based ar-
chitecture (Figure 4.1) which can be implemented to monitor the data plane
for correlated connections and stepping stones. The sFlow enabled switches
sample packets passing through them and forward the header information to
a central collection and analysis module. The data analysis module removes
redundancy in received information and maps sampled headers to connec-
tions. It also identifies ON and OFF periods in connections in order to cor-
relate them. The timing based stepping stone detection techniques as well as
the anomaly-based chaff detection techniques have been implemented within
our analyzer module. Correlations and anomalies are detected in real-time
and stored in a forensic data store for future reference.
Our implementation could effectively correlate connections and detect
stepping stones for the relatively high packet sampling rates of 1/1 and 1/10.
The implemented chaff detection techniques also perform well under similar
conditions. Nevertheless, with lower sampling rates, the analyzer misses
out critical information and hence the detection becomes ineffective. One
solution could be to make the detection mechanism reactive, in which case
higher sampling rates for shorter periods of time might be affordable. We
also successfully correlated non-consecutive connections in a stepping stone
chain. The same technique can be used to correlate the first and last links
in an anonymity network to expose an attacker that logs back to its own
network via an anonymity service such as Tor.
Future work should be aimed at making the solution scalable. A dis-
tributed sFlow controller is needed in large networks. The existing central-
ized solution should be modified to fit the distributed model. A distributed
in-memory cache can be used in place of the forensic data store, which will
reduce the number of disk accesses and enhance the performance of the de-
tection mechanisms.
We conclude by claiming that our work can act as a starting point for
researchers in the field of network monitoring and stepping stone detection
in SDN and NFV environments.
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